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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OPTIONS FOR THE LOCAL SUBSIDIARIES 
OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES1 
Abstract 
While the corporate governance literature generally focuses on the parent legal 
entity, many organisations are now multinational enterprises (MNEs) with 
subsidiaries that are most often legal entities in their host countries.  Despite the 
strengthening of corporate governance regimes internationally, the boards of these 
subsidiaries are in many instances perfunctory.  This paper examines the question of 
whether developments in corporate governance theory and practice can add value for 
the local subsidiaries of MNEs.  
This paper provides a theoretical basis for evaluating governance models in 
MNEs. The paper commences with a review of the key concepts from the MNE and 
conglomerates literature with respect to core MNE strategies.  The paper then 
discusses what the “governance roles” are that must be performed in MNE 
subsidiaries.   We propose four governance frameworks for subsidiary corporations.  
These frameworks are:  (1) Direct Control; (2) Dual Reporting; (3) Advisory Board; 
(4) Local Board.  We consider the strengths and weaknesses of each model in relation 
to international strategy theory.  We conclude with recommendations for the 
conditions under which the various models may be appropriate and practical 
guidelines for the utilisation of corporate governance theory to improve MNE 
performance.  
Key words:  corporate governance; multinational enterprises; subsidiary companies
                                                 
1 This paper was presented at the 8th International Conference on Corporate Governance and Board 
Leadership, 11-13 October 2005 at the Centre for Board Effectiveness, Henley Management College. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OPTIONS FOR THE LOCAL SUBSIDIARIES 
OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
 
Introduction 
International business is dominated by both large and small multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), a trend that is set to continue as the pace of globalisation 
quickens.  The corporate governance literature, however, often ignores the governance 
of MNE subsidiaries (MNSs).  In most jurisdictions the MNE will have created a legal 
entity under that jurisdiction’s laws to conduct the business of the MNS.  In these 
jurisdictions this requires the appointment of local directors.  Often the boards of 
directors in these subsidiaries have played a token role, fulfilling only the statutory 
duties required under the host country’s legal system.  They often play no real role in 
the governance of the subsidiary.  This situation is changing however as MNEs 
recognise that subsidiary boards (SBs) can, in some circumstances, add value to the 
subsidiary (Gillies and Dickinson, 1999).  Our objective in this paper is to provide a 
theoretical explanation and a series of research propositions as to the circumstances 
under which SBs operating in Anglo-American legal systems can add value. 
To do so we first review the literature on governance and MNSs. We then 
consider the key governance roles that SBs may play.  We review the MNE and 
conglomerates literature with respect to core MNE strategies and discuss these in 
relation to governance roles.  We propose four governance frameworks for subsidiary 
corporations.  These frameworks are:  (1) Direct Control; (2) Dual Reporting; (3) 
Advisory Board; and (4) Local Board.  We outline the key features of each model and 
discuss their advantages and disadvantages.  We further consider the strengths and 
weaknesses of each model in relation to international strategy theory.   
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We conclude with recommendations for the conditions under which the 
various models may be appropriate and practical guidelines for the utilisation of 
corporate governance theory to improve MNE performance. It should be noted that 
we restrict our discussion to unitary boards in countries with Anglo-American legal 
systems, as dual-board systems are beyond the scope of this paper.  We also restrict 
our discussion to 100 percent owned MNE subsidiaries. 
Previous Studies 
While an emerging literature is developing on international differences in 
corporate governance, and there are arguments for and against an international 
convergence of practices (e.g. Aguilera and Jackson 2003, Guillén, 2000, Rubach and 
Sebora, 1998), little has been written on the governance of MNE subsidiaries. 
The paucity of literature on the governance of MNE subsidiaries is limited, 
perhaps due to the fact that a SB is just one of the coordination and control 
mechanisms an MNE can employ to manage a MNS (Martinez and Jarillo, 1989). 
In an early study, Leksell and Lindgren (1982) examined the role of SBs of 
Swedish MNEs.  They identified three main board roles, which they characterised as 
external roles (external relations; advice), internal roles (control and monitoring; 
coordination and integration; strategy formulation) and the legal role. They found that 
a major factor in determining the roles performed by a SB was the strategic 
importance of the subsidiary to the parent corporation – the parent gave more 
attention to the strategically important subsidiaries, e.g. by appointing more senior 
parent corporation managers to the SBs.  However, the SBs did not, in general, play 
an active role in strategic planning. 
Kriger and Rich (1987) examined how MNEs made use of SBs, finding that 
only a minority of MNEs used these boards proactively. The authors did note the 
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value of SBs to their parent corporations where they were allowed to play an active 
governance role.  In a survey of the SBs of MNEs located in North American, Japan 
and Europe, Kriger (1988) further investigated the role of SBs.  His results showed 
that Japanese MNEs made more active use of SBs than their North American and 
European counterparts, who viewed SBs as only being useful in fulfilling statutory 
requirements.  While Kriger found that increased use was being made of SBs, he 
noted that the roles these boards are required to play is related to the parent 
corporation’s strategy in the host country. 
Björkman (1994) presents the results of a survey on the use of SBs in French 
and Norwegian units owned by Swedish and French MNEs.  Although for many 
MNEs the role of SBs was limited, in those firms that used their SBs actively, strategy 
and budget approval were considered as important roles. These findings contrast to 
those of earlier studies in which budget participation and strategy formulation were 
not functions performed by SBs (Kriger, 1988; 1991; Leksell and Lindgren, 1982). 
Using Canadian data, Gillies and Dickinson (1999) conclude that despite the 
benefits “strong, relatively independent subsidiaries” can bring to MNEs, SBs are not 
playing an increasing role in the operations of MNEs.  In fact, contrary to 
expectations, the authors (Gillies and Dickenson, 1999: 242) find that “the role of 
subsidiary boards is rapidly declining”. 
In a more recent study, Strikwerda (2003: 55) focused on the devolution of 
powers from parent corporate boards to SBs concluding that while devolving powers 
may involve “angst and anxiety” for the parent corporation’s board, they should 
encourage their SBs to act as independent corporations to meet the demands of 
changing markets and technologies, adjusting the SBs’ decision-making powers as the 
business environment evolves. 
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Theory Development 
While models concerning the factors which shape differences in international 
governance practices, such as that proposed by Aguilera and Jackson (2003), provide 
a rich exploration of differences in governance practices of the main board for firms 
whose head office and major sources of capital are located in a specific country, these 
influences apply to a much lesser extent in determining wholly-owned SB structures. 
Wholly-owned subsidiaries are often equity funded by the parent, which 
removes the impact of local equity capital markets in shaping subsidiary governance 
needs.  Local debt funding may be used to meet some of the funding requirements of 
the MNS.  However, such debt funding will be monitored through lending covenants 
and often parent company guarantees; consequently, having little or no impact on 
requirements for a SB.   
As the scope of the paper is for MNS in countries in Anglo-American legal 
structures, the impact of labour in determining the SB requirements is unlikely to be a 
major factor (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003).  Finally, many MNS have expatriate 
managers in senior management positions (e.g. Björkman, 1994; Kriger, 1988; Luo, 
2005), which, while not completely removing the impact of management in shaping 
SB decisions, means that the factors which will shape the MNE board in its home 
country with respect to the influence of managerial factors on governance structures is 
likely to be less of an issue in determining SB requirements.   
In extending the findings of the SB literature, we contend that previous 
writings have not explicitly attempted to link the conditions under which particular 
MNE strategies may be linked to different roles for SBs and consequently different 
board models for the MNS. To develop this contingency perspective we first briefly 
review a common model of MNE strategy which contrasts the key dimensions of the 
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pressures for cost reduction and the pressures for local responsiveness required for the 
MNS’s market. We then review the key governance roles that a SB may play. We use 
these role dimensions to propose four distinctive models for the use of a board in 
MNS governance. We then relate these models to the MNE strategies to propose that 
various MNE strategies favour different governance models. This discussion 
concludes with a series of research propositions based on the alignment of global 
strategy with governance models. 
1. MNE Strategies 
As in the general strategy literature, there are numerous strategy models in 
international business (Hill, 2003).  One model contrasts two major forces which any 
multinational must consider – the extent to which global strategy needs to drive for 
low costs and the requirement for products and services to be adapted for specific 
domestic market conditions. On the cost dimension, some industries globally need to 
drive for low global costs. For example, semiconductors are a global industry where 
cost drivers are all important and where significant economies of scale are available 
from production facilities geared to global markets. At the other end of the spectrum, 
building and construction industries are heavily reliant on local cost structures and 
there are no significant economies of scale in global operations.  
A similar situation exists with respect to the need for product/service 
customisation to local market conditions. Again, the semiconductor industry requires 
no customisation for local market conditions and the same product can be sold in 
multiple markets, whereas building and construction is highly customised to meet 
local physical conditions, building regulations, and accepted construction practices. 
Consequently, a popular model for considering global business strategy is to 
consider the alternatives which arise when considering cost reduction pressures on the 
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one hand and the extent of local market responsiveness on the other hand.  To 
simplify what are obviously a limitless number of options, commentators have 
categorised a parent corporation’s strategy for competing in multiple-national markets 
into one of four generic strategies (Hill, 2003; Hill and Jones, 1998) (see Figure 1):  
1. Global strategy – Corporations pursuing this strategy do not customise 
their products or marketing strategy for local markets. This strategy is used 
where there is pressure for global integration and cost reduction and the 
need for local responsiveness is limited.  This strategy is often associated 
with industrial products. 
2. Transnational strategy – This strategy is used where the pressures for cost 
reductions and local responsiveness are high.  It has been argued that this 
is the new reality of many international markets (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1992). These competing demands make this a difficult strategy to pursue.  
There is often a mixture of decentralised decision making at the subsidiary 
level and centralised decision making at the parent corporation level when 
following this strategy. Caterpillar, for example, has been cited as pursuing 
a transnational strategy (Hill and Jones, 1998). 
3. International strategy – Corporations using this strategy centralise their 
core competencies such as R&D and core marketing, but leave other 
decision making to subsidiary operations. The strategy involves 
establishing value creation activities in many of their international 
markets. This strategy is most successful where the pressure for local 
responsiveness is low, since corporations operating under this model incur 
high costs, as they tend to duplicate their manufacturing and related 
business functions 
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4. . Multidomestic strategy – A multidomestic strategy sees the firm focus on 
local responsiveness, transferring skills and products to overseas markets.  
It is most successful when the pressure for cost reduction is low.  As with 
an international strategy, there is often a duplication of manufacturing 
functions.  A multidomestic strategy is often associated with substantial 
strategic decision making at the subsidiary level. This strategy can be 
observed among the large international construction firms. 
The optimal strategy is based on a corporation assessing both the ability to 
integrate global operations and cost reduction pressures together with determining the 
need for responsiveness to distinct local market needs. 
 
INSERT FIGURE1 HERE 
 
2. Governance Roles 
In the absence of any international system of corporate law, MNEs must 
operate within the legal boundaries of the countries in which their subsidiaries are 
located, regardless of their global business strategy.  Under Anglo-American legal 
systems both private and public corporations are governed by a board of directors.  It 
is therefore the board of directors of the MNS that will be most influenced by a parent 
corporation’s control philosophy, since the parent board and management will decide 
the powers delegated to a SB.  
The fundamental duties of a company director are established under law, for 
example, the Companies Act 1985 in the United Kingdom and the Corporations Act 
2001 in Australia, and augmented with other statutory duties, such as health and 
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safety regulations.  Furthermore, common law (also called case law) uses court 
judgments to interpret statute law.   
A director’s major duties can be defined as: (i) a fiduciary duty to act in the 
corporation’s best interests and to not benefit personally at the expense of the 
corporation and (ii) a duty of care and diligence to act with a reasonable level of 
dedication and expertise in the role.   
To discharge these duties, a conventional board needs to undertake a number 
of governance roles, which can be gleaned from a number of prominent guidelines 
and recommendations on corporate governance.  These include the Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003) in Australia, The Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2003) in the UK and the OECD’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004).   
When considering the potential role of a board at the subsidiary level we 
suggest there are four main roles a SB board may potentially perform.  These key 
governance functions can be summarised as follows: 
1. Strategic role: For parent corporations, whether domestic, multi-country or 
fully global, it is generally accepted today that the board has a significant 
role to play in the formulation and adoption of a company’s strategic 
direction.  The question for MNEs is the extent to which a SB can add 
value to the strategic role at the MNS level. 
2. CEO role: Again, it is now well accepted that for the parent board one of 
the major functions of the board is to appoint, review, remunerate, work 
through and replace (when necessary) the CEO. The board/CEO 
relationship is crucial to effective corporate governance because it is the 
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link between the board’s role in determining the organisation’s strategic 
direction and management’s role in achieving corporate objectives. The 
question for the MNE is whether head office or possibly regional 
management are best placed to perform this role with respect to the local 
subsidiary senior management or whether a local board can perform a 
meaningful role in this regard. 
3. Monitoring and control: Monitoring corporate performance is an essential 
board function because it ensures that corporate decision making is 
consistent with the strategy of the organisation and with owners’ 
expectations. With respect to the subsidiary, the question arises as to 
whether the monitor and control role is best performed by managers from a 
head or regional office or whether a functioning local board can add value 
in this respect. 
4. Access to resources:  Another way in which the board contributes to firm 
performance is by networking with its customers, suppliers and other 
stakeholders. All companies, whatever the size or nature of their business, 
need to attract outside resources to achieve organisational goals and 
networking is an important way of accessing those resources. Again, there 
is a continuum of potential needs for a subsidiary in this respect. This may 
range from minimal requirements for specific resources to be accessed at 
the local level, to situations where high-level access to government, 
customers, financiers or other key local providers of resources to the 
subsidiary are essential. 
Finally, from a practical perspective, in considering governance roles at the 
subsidiary level, the MNE main board and management and any SB which exists and 
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MNS management should be cognisant of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (2000).  In particular, General Policy 6 of the guidelines maintains that 
MNEs should “Support and uphold good corporate governance principles and develop 
and apply good corporate governance practices” in the countries in which they 
operate. 
3. Governance Models 
We now bring this literature on corporate governance and global business 
strategy together to suggest four possible models for SB governance. As is the case 
with global business strategies discussed earlier, these four models are for illustrative 
purposes, as there are an infinite number of variations available. The four governance 
frameworks we propose for subsidiary corporations are:  (1) Direct Control, (2) Dual 
Reporting, (3) Advisory Board and (4) Local Board.  As discussed below, each model 
has its advantages and disadvantages in the case of local subsidiaries.   
Model 1 – Direct Control 
In Model 1, the subsidiary’s corporate governance functions are undertaken 
solely by the parent corporation (Figure 2).  The parent management structure governs 
the company.  The subsidiary’s legal board, comprised entirely of local managers, is a 
compliance board with no formal responsibilities outside those required under law 
(for example, conducting the annual general meeting and attesting to legal matters 
such as the annual corporate reporting to regulators).  This model may also have 
matrix reporting of senior subsidiary line managers to equivalent line managers in the 
parent corporation.  For example, the local HR manager may report to the local CEO 
and the parent HR manager.   
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Limited governance processes are required under this model.  For example, 
board meetings are only held as required under law and are strictly formalities.  The 
information flows are contingent upon the parent’s requirements.  The parent 
corporation will usually require extensive and regular financial reporting, and often 
seek to make or at least overview all major strategic decisions. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
The major strengths of this model are that the parent corporation has direct 
control over the subsidiary. It will be able to attain global efficiencies through greater 
integration of operations and there will be clear reporting lines for the local CEO. 
The major weaknesses are that the parent corporation may not adequately 
understand the local market when making key decisions, control of the subsidiary may 
be fragmented across multiple managers and, therefore, be less effective. Delays in 
decision making may also occur due to continually referring decisions to the parent’s 
management. 
Model 2 – Dual Reporting 
In Model 2 (Figure 3), the subsidiary’s corporate governance is split between a 
local board and the parent corporation.  As a result, the subsidiary CEO has a dual 
reporting line to the local board and most often to the parent management structure.  
The local board also has a communication line to the parent governance or 
management structure.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
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The local board is legally constituted and directors have the resulting duties 
under the host country’s legal system.  The local board’s roles are contingent upon the 
parent’s requirements and delegations.  It will typically play a stronger role in the 
governance roles that benefit from greater local knowledge and contacts.  These roles 
include networking, stakeholder communication, compliance and policy making.  It 
may also have a role in strategy and monitoring.  Similarly, the parent’s role in the 
subsidiary’s governance depends on the roles it requires of the local board.   
The strengths of this model are contingent on clear governance demarcation 
between the roles of the parent and the SB.  They include: (1) improved understanding 
of the local market and networking ability compared to there being no local board; (2) 
creating management discipline by the SB CEO being compelled to regularly report to 
a board; and (3) the board being on the ground and able to provide advice and 
feedback directly to the CEO. 
Among the major weaknesses of Model 2 are the potential for governance role 
duplication and inefficiency with management doing work twice or the parent and the 
SB performing overlapping roles.  Further, the SB’s role may be disempowered by the 
parent, which may also cause dissatisfaction amongst directors.  There is also the 
possibility of uncertainty for the local CEO as to reporting lines; and the parent 
corporation managers and/or directors may become shadow directors of the subsidiary 
(and so have the same overall legal responsibilities as the SB directors). 
Model 3 – Advisory Board  
A governance model sometimes observed is for the SB to create an advisory board. 
The advisory board contains local people who are not formally registered as directors, 
but who are given specific roles and responsibilities which mirror some of the roles of 
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formal boards.  Under Model 3 (Figure 4), the subsidiary’s corporate governance role 
is undertaken solely by the parent corporation’s management and is usually in 
compliance to local legal requirements as seen under Model 1.  The subsidiary CEO 
reports to parent management.  This results in the parent having direct control over the 
subsidiary’s activities without the existence of an “active” SB.  The advisory board 
has no decision-making power (unless specifically delegated by the parent 
corporation).  The advisory board is allocated specific aspects of the four governance 
roles and it then counsels the CEO accordingly.  These roles are usually those where 
greater local market knowledge or an on-the-ground presence is beneficial.  As the 
advisory board only advises the CEO, the CEO is under no obligation to heed its 
advice.   However, if the CEO consistently acts against the advice of the advisory 
board, then the board would be most likely restructured or abolished. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
The major strengths of Model 3 are: the parent’s capacity for direct control over the 
subsidiary; the subsidiary’s ability to benefit from the advisory board’s understanding 
of and contacts in the local market; the ability to nominate clear reporting lines for the 
local CEO; and advisory board directors are not subject to the duties of being a 
director and the associated risks, provided they do not act as “shadow” directors. 
However, there are a number of weaknesses with Model 3.  These are: that for 
a subsidiary with substantial local market responsiveness, the parent may not 
adequately understand the local market when making key decisions as time and 
distance may not allow more active involvement by overseas directors/managers in 
customer meetings, site visits, key corporate functions, etc., which are important to 
gain local knowledge; the potential for geographic isolation, time zone differences, 
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cultural differences and local market conditions to inhibit appropriate monitoring and 
providing subsequent feedback to the subsidiary; the potential for decisions requiring 
resolution more promptly than the parent manager or advisory board meeting timings 
allow; and the additional cost of retaining and administering the advisory board in 
comparison to Model 1: Direct Control. 
Model 4 – Local Board 
Model 4 (Figure 5) sees the subsidiary’s corporate governance undertaken entirely by 
a local board.  This SB is legally constituted and directors have the resulting legal 
duties.  The SB has full control of the subsidiary and performs all four board roles.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
 
Under this model in its purest form, the parent corporation’s role in subsidiary 
corporate governance is purely that of a shareholder.  This shareholder role is 
undertaken by the parent governance structure or management structure.  As the 
shareholder, the parent appoints the SB (consistent with its constitution) and may have 
some personnel on the SB.  The SB then has full autonomy for governing the 
subsidiary’s operations and is accountable for its performance and the subsidiary’s 
performance to the shareholder. With regard to processes, the SB functions as a 
conventional board.  
The local board is expected to assert strong control over subsidiary 
management; tight outcome (financial) control is used by the parent over the local 
board and management; and this model is often associated with corporations which 
have a multi-domestic strategy. 
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There are a number of major strengths associated with Model 4.  These 
include the clarity in governance roles and that local decision makers have a strong 
understanding of the local environment.  Minimum time and resource investment are 
required at the parent level when the subsidiary is performing strongly and the 
subsidiary has the ability to adapt to the local environment. 
The major weaknesses of Model 4 are the difficulty in any overseas-based 
parent directors attending local board meetings; the parent corporation does not have 
direct control over the business; and the parent has little understanding of the local 
environment should it need to become involved in subsidiary decision making. 
4. Propositions 
Figure 6 shows how these four board models relate to the key board roles set 
out earlier.  Each model is associated with a greater or lesser extent of delegation or 
expectation with each of the four key board roles. It is then possible to theorise that 
the different board models will perform more effectively depending upon the global 
strategy adopted by the MNE, which is depicted in Figure 7. 
 
INSERT FIGURES 6 and 7 HERE 
 
Dual Reporting (Model 2) boards are hypothesised to be better suited to 
international strategies, since head office still wishes to keep tight control over the 
MNS’s activities, but at the same time a significant amount of assets may be located 
in the international market. The MNS will benefit by “on-the-ground” directors tightly 
monitoring the use of these assets and also providing key links to local business 
communities and regulators. 
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Direct Control (Model 1) may be appropriate where there is few production 
facilities located in the domestic market and there is minimal local adaptation of 
product and services. 
A Local Board (Model 4) may be the appropriate model where considerable 
local responsiveness is required and where significant local assets are located in the 
MNS’s country. This governance structure allows for close monitoring of the use of 
these assets plus the local knowledge with respect to local market conditions, contacts 
to customers, regulators and other key interest groups. 
Finally, an Advisory Board (Model 3) may be the appropriate model where a 
MNE is following a transnational strategy of pursuing both local market 
responsiveness and global integration. The advisory board can be tasked with those 
roles that require local contact and networks while not impeding decisions that are 
aimed at improving global cost reductions. 
Related to these models we have developed a number of propositions. The first 
set of propositions couple international strategy with SB governance model. 
Specifically: 
 
Proposition 1:  A Direct Control model is more likely to be associated 
with a global strategy. 
Proposition 2:  An Advisory Board model is more likely to be 
associated with a transnational strategy. 
Proposition 3:  A Dual Reporting model is more likely to be 
associated with an international strategy. 
Proposition 4:  A Local Board model is more likely to be associated 
with the multi-domestic strategy. 
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The second series of propositions relate the dimensions of international 
strategy to SB performance. Specifically: 
 
Proposition 5:  The Direct Control model coupled with a higher need 
for global integration and cost reductions, and a lower need for 
market responsiveness, will be associated with superior subsidiary 
performance. 
Proposition 6: The Dual Reporting model coupled with a lower need 
for global integration and cost reductions, and lower need for market 
responsiveness, will be associated with superior subsidiary 
performance. 
Proposition 7: The Advisory Board model coupled with a higher need 
for global integration and cost reductions, and higher need for market 
responsiveness, will be associated with superior subsidiary 
performance. 
Proposition 8: The Local Board model coupled with a lower need for 
global integration and cost reductions, and a higher need for market 
responsiveness, will be associated with superior subsidiary 
performance. 
Conclusion 
This paper attempts to relate alternative governance models for MNSs with 
generic international business strategies. The paper makes a contribution by 
establishing a contingency theory concerning the governance control of MNSs.  It also 
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makes a contribution by identifying four fundamental models of governance available 
to MNEs and linking these back to the major roles which boards can play. 
The paper has implications for MNEs in that it provides a framework to 
consider the use of contemporary corporate governance thinking to produce improved 
performance for international subsidiaries. We hope that the paper may engender 
debate in this area. 
For researchers, the challenge is to test the model to determine whether the 
predictions contained in the eight propositions are found to hold in practice. One 
difficulty will be that previous research suggests that few MNEs have used 
governance models other than direct control. If this is the case, then deductive 
reasoning may require some MNEs to experiment with alternative governance models 
prior to large scale empirical tests of the theory becoming a viable research strategy. It 
may be that case research, focusing on specific MNEs and their MNSs may be a 
necessary first step in research. 
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Figure 1: Four basic strategies for entering and competing internationally 
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 Figure 6: Board Roles and Board Models 
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Figure 7:  Board Models and Global Strategies 
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